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Abstract 
This paper investigates the mutual interdependencies between organizational architectures, decision 
making and performance. Through applying agency-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we reveal how 
three types of organizational structure (hierarchical, polyarchical and hybrid) aggregate innovations on 
the micro level into corporate performance. By considering three different initial project portfolios (in-
cremental innovations, innovations with spillover effects and innovations that have to overcome a criti-
cal mass), we analyze which organizational architectures may be superior regarding selecting good pro-
jects, avoiding collective myopia and overcoming organizational inertia. Results suggest that in a risky 
environment, firms with rigid hierarchies can achieve a much higher performance than horizontally or-
ganized firms even when the quality of the decision-making by managers is poor. Results also highlight 
the dangers involved in erecting a more hybrid-type organization because such an organization might 
become over-challenged and unable to handle risky innovations adequately. Finally, we discuss how 
firms could be structured to increase performance and to minimize risks.   
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The past decade has seen a rise in the opinion that hierarchical firms exhibit inferior corporate 
performance compared to firms with a more horizontal form of organization (for a discussion see e.g. 
Benner & Tushman, 2003, pp. 252-253 as well as Keupp et al., 2012), and examples often quoted include 
cases of team structures (Foss & Lindenberg, 2012; Foss & Lindenberg, 2013; Lindenberg & Foss, 2011; 
Reagans et al., 2016) or open network-like forms of organizing (Cheng et al., 2014; Felin & Zenger, 
2014; Sheremata, 2004; Tushman, 2015; West & Bogers, 2013; Wolter & Veloso, 2008). The core 
arguments against hierarchical decision-making include that such organizations constrain the 
proliferation of beneficial innovations because communication and decision making is restricted (Davis 
et al., 2009; DeCanio et al., 2000). These debates imply that an increased horizontal structure, like teams 
or open network-like ‘hybrid” architectures, would result in a better economic performance.  
However, such claims may be misleading if organizations have to choose between risky innovations, 
especially where these are costly (Mellor, 2019). In such a world, a core challenge of the organization 
is to adopt “good” innovations (e. g. good innovations have more benefits than costs for the organization) 
and reject “bad” ones (e. g. projects that cause higher costs than benefits, which in turn could be due to 
poor implementation, spiraling costs or other negative outcomes; examples are presented by Khanna et 
al., 2016; van der Panne et al., 2003; Priem et al., 2012; and Stevens and Burley, 1997). As Baregheh 
et al, (2009) highlight, the term “innovation” has many meanings and connotations, making it quite 
difficult to present a unique definition. But within a for-profit firm, the organization’s inherent logic 
reveals a striking similarity that focuses on the functionality within the organization: every change in 
the processes, products or managerial practices that increases the corporate value is a “good” innovation, 
while changes that reduce the value are “bad” ones. 
Choosing innovations from risky portfolios in an appropriate way depends not only on the decision-
maker’s (usually managers and their subordinates, committees or teams) skill in evaluating an 
innovation, but also upon the organizational architecture, which has a reverberating and indeed 
determining effect on the organization’s performance because it defines how risky decisions are made 
and implemented (Sah & Stiglitz, 1985; as well as Sah & Stiglitz, 1986). Surprisingly, previous studies 
considering a risky environment with bounded rationality (Simon, 1982), have found that traditional 
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hierarchical firms may exhibit superior performance when compared to more horizontal organizations 
(Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Csazsar, 2012; Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). Conversely, when 
considering horizontal organizations, bounded rationality may even result in collective myopia 
(Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014; Mellor 2015a, Mellor 2015b; Sydow et al., 2009), which in turn has even 
further negative consequences for the organization.  
Put briefly; one problem is poor decision making, but inappropriate organizational architectures 
aggregate this into low performance, and a better understanding of organizational architectures may 
uncover quite counter-intuitive results compared to simple ad-hoc theories regarding the pros and cons 
of horizontal, hierarchical and hybrid organizing (Ethiraj & Leveninthal, 2004b). This may also explain 
why organizations may perform badly after becoming more team-friendly, hybrid and/or ambidextrous. 
Moreover, it is utopian to believe that one single architecture can achieve optimal results in all 
environments and developmental stages and indeed, as Argyres & Silverman (2004) and Siggelkow & 
Rivkin (2005) argue, different designs may be differentially appropriate, depending on the 
professionality, size and complexity of the organization and its relationship with its immediate 
environment. That view notwithstanding, the question about what an appropriate combination of 
hierarchical and horizontal structures is for a firm (regarding e.g. risks of innovations and the degree of 
bounded rationality) remains an open question (see e.g. Christensen & Knudsen, 2010; Csaszar, 2013; 
Csaszar & Eggers, 2013; Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014). While acknowledging that many other approaches 
are feasible, here we present a purely mathematical approach on this theme in the tradition of Sah & 
Stiglitz (1985) as well as Sah & Stiglitz (1986). Furthermore, the Stata regression analyses allow this 
work to give more accurate results than hitherto available. 
Many scholars in the field of organizational ambidexterity and innovation management argue that hybrid 
structures would achieve a higher performance compared to traditional hierarchical firms (for the alleged 
superior performance of teams see Reagans et al., 2016; Young-Hyman, 2016; for the alleged superiority 
of ambidextrous organizations see Benner & Tushman, 2003; Benner & Tushman, 2015; and O’Reilly 
III & Tushman, 2013; and for quite similar arguments see the debate on open innovations (Cheng et al., 
2014; Felin & Zenger, 2014; West & Bogers, 2013; Wolter & Veloso, 2008). However, contributions 
in the field of organizational architectures reveal that hybrid structures often achieve only average 
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performance (see for example Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). These realizations led some authors e.g. 
Christensen & Knudsen (2010) to argue that an appropriate combination of poly- and hierarchical 
structures may create a better corporate architecture despite the fact that single parts are imperfect 
(because of bounded rationality), and Knudsen & Levinthal (2007) contributed to this discussion by 
pointing out that the strength of hybrid organizations is the ability to select good projects through 
polyarchical structures plus the implementation of successful projects through hierarchies. As a 
consequence, the respective strengths of both systems can be combined and their respective weaknesses 
(thought of as the difficulty in implementing common strategies in polyarchies, versus the selection of 
a diverse portfolio in a hierarchy), is reduced.  
Thus the first contribution of this paper concerns how organizational structures can be designed to 
achieve better outcomes despite bounded rationality (Csaszar, 2012; Csaszar, 2013), and our findings 
indicate that hybrid structures may exhibit problematic side-effects regarding the handling of 
commission (first order) and omission (second order) errors (Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014), thus 
explaining why companies may for example hesitate to implement team structures, despite their positive 
motivational effects on organizational behavior. 
Secondly, a clever combination of polyarchical and hierarchical elements in an organization can cause 
surprising outcomes; Ethiraj & Leveninthal (2004b) argue that simple ad hoc assumptions regarding the 
performance of hierarchies and polyarchies may be wrong and that at least one wide-spread assumption 
about hierarchies, namely that they have difficulties in adapting to rapid environmental changes (see for 
example Birkinshaw et al., 2008 as well as Subramanian & Nilakanta, 1996) may be contentious because 
even highly centralized hierarchies can change rapidly as long as the command structure promotes good 
decisions and fast implementations. In contrast to hierarchies, polyarchies – like markets – are often 
seen as highly flexible and able to handle even radical changes and these agile characteristics are positive 
in turbulent times. However, dysfunctional feedback in polyarchies can prevent adaptation and result in 
chaos. Thus, one could speculate that there does not have to be a natural superiority of one economic 
system, and that good performance depends on the structures of decision-making and implementation 
(as proposed by Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014). Indeed, it was Schumpeter (1942, 2003) who argued that 
it is not only small entrepreneurs who cause "creative destruction", but also that large organizations with 
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appropriate structures can promote innovations en masse. Our findings emphasize that hierarchies may 
be superior compared to market-like polyarchies because the latter may collapse in an environment with 
risky innovations, due to taking up too many poor innovations.  
Thirdly, a commonly-held view is that there are benefits in reducing coordination costs (or the critical 
mass of an organization that has to be overcome in order to implement innovations, see Sydow et al., 
2009; Mellor, 2018; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002) and that poor performance can be attributed to 
managers failing to do so. However, our findings highlight that under particular circumstances, high 
coordination costs (and a high critical mass) can be beneficial for organizations because these parameters 
make it more difficult for risky innovation to pervade the organization. Surprisingly, this is especially 
true for hybrid organizations because these organizations often fail in ousting bad innovations. This 
provides support for the idea of Knudsen & Srikanth (2014) that hybrid organizations bear an 
architectural disadvantage when collective myopia may cause a kind of herd behavior and end up ruining 
the whole organization.  
Fourthly, we differentiate not only between hierarchical, polyarchical and hybrid architectures but we 
also take up the call for further research by Csaszar & Eggers (2013) about how organizational 
architectures leverage risk. By including a range of initial project portfolios with different levels of risks, 
we estimate the effect of each organizational structure on the leverage of risk, revealing under which 
conditions reducing risks and increasing performance are complementary and under which conditions a 
tradeoff emerges between risk and performance.   
In this work we use an agency approach to simulate a range of different ideal-typical architectures in 
order to achieve a comprehensive range of test factors (Davis et al., 2007). Results were then additionally 
analyzed by a second independent round of regression analyses. As a consequence of this rigorous 
approach, underlying and hitherto unsuspected systematic patterns were revealed about how 
organizational architecture aggregates the selection of risky innovations into organizational 
performance. The investigation includes a range of three different initial portfolios: Firstly, innovations 
with only incremental effects, secondly, innovations that have spillover effects and thus may end in 
collective myopia, and thirdly, innovations that require a critical mass of supporters to be implemented, 
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otherwise the organization would stay on its inertial path. The next section summarizes our formal 
models and the simulation approach used.   
 
2.  Simulating the Impact of Innovative Behavior on Corporate Performance 
This section investigates the dichotomy of polyarchies and hierarchies (see Sah & Stiglitz 1985, 1986) 
and also different hybrid structures (see e.g. Christensen & Knudsen, 2010; Knudson & Levinthal, 2007; 
Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005) by employing an agency-based simulation. The approach follows that of 
Sah & Stiglitz (1985, 1986) in that decision makers choose innovations blindly from an initial portfolio 
containing projects with “negative” as well as “positive” consequences for organizational performance. 
Typically, innovators are often convinced that their innovations will create high profits, but in reality, 
and for a wide variety of reasons, innovations often fail (van der Panne et al., 2003; Stevens & Burley, 
1997), incurring costs and wasting scarce resources (Khanna et al., 2016; Priem et al., 2012). In an ex 
post consideration, adopting these innovations should not have been attempted, however, ex ante, such 
assessments are clearly difficult (Berg, 2016). This is followed by an analysis of how different 
organizational architectures mitigate risky innovations if decision makers are imperfect in evaluating 
the quality of an innovation.  
Across all permutations of organizational architectures (as well as the spectrum of initial project 
portfolio), the basic rule of the decision-maker is: implement an innovation if the expected gain is 
positive and do not implement the innovation if the expected value is negative, although an individual’s 
rationality is limited due to limited and unreliable information, limited capacities to evaluate and process 
information, or a limited amount of time for making a decision (Simon, 1982). Because of this, decision-
makers cannot evaluate the full consequences of an innovation, and may make errors of the first order 
(error of commission) and second order (error of omission) (see Sah & Stiglitz 1985, 1986), meaning 
that for the economic performance of an organization, accepting good innovations increases 
performance, rejecting bad ones avoids losses, rejecting good projects has opportunity costs (omission 
error) in a world with competition, and accepting bad projects creates losses (commission error).  
 
2.1 Varying the type of innovations 
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First, we assume that decision-makers have to choose projects from differing portfolios of initial 
innovations and because of this, wrong decisions (e. g. omission and commission errors) have different 
organizational outcomes and these outcomes are partially determined by the organizational architecture. 
 
2.1.1 Innovations with incremental effects: This simulation is reminiscent of the previous approaches 
of Sah & Stiglitz (1985, 1986) as well as Christensen & Knudsen (2010), Csaszar (2013), Knudson & 
Levinthal (2007) and Siggelkow & Rivkin (2005) in that after the decision regarding the implementation 
of an innovation has been made, the innovation’s real (cash) value becomes apparent with regard to 
determining the omission and commission mistakes. This means that a decision-maker evaluates the 
innovation and implements or rejects the innovation accordingly, leading to four possible outcomes; 
accept a “good” innovation, reject a “bad” one, accept “bad” innovations (commission error), or reject 
“good” innovations (omission error). Clearly, accepting a “good” project means the organization will 
gain by this decision according to the real cash value that reveals itself afterward and in the case of 
accepting a “bad” project, this innovation will also reveal its cash value after the decision and this value 
reduces the corporate performance. Rejecting good and bad projects bears opportunity costs and these 
effects can be revealed by comparing the average performance of different architectures and, by 
applying additional regression, we get a more profound picture of the mitigating effects of organizational 
architectures (see section findings).  
 
2.1.2 Innovations with spillover effects: The second project portfolio assumes that colleagues can 
follow innovators and implement the innovation just as the innovator did. In the case that peers follow 
the innovator, we have a spillover. For example, one employee comes up with an organizational 
innovation (for example how to handle customer feedback) and their peers can decide whether they 
follow the innovator or not. By doing so, we differentiate between two variations of our model (see the 
section on findings). In the first variation, we follow the idea of Knudsen & Srikanth (2014, p. 416) that 
in organizations “flawed mental models may never be corrected in coordinated exploration because of 
enduring epistemic interdependence. This is in sharp contrast to models of unitary search in which 
epistemic interdependence is absent, and correction of mental models is possible.” As a consequence, 
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organizations may suffer from collective myopia because individuals tend to follow their peers instead 
of critically questioning their suggestions. The dynamic effects of collective myopia can significantly 
reinforce the innovations’ effects on organizational performance, both for the better as well as for the 
worse. In the case of a poor project, joint myopia may cause overly heavy negative consequences for 
the organization. However, and in the case of a good project, joint myopia can lead to extremely positive 
consequences, as indeed Acs et al. (2009), De Bondt (1997) and Harhoff et al., (2003) highlight.  
In the second model variation, peers individually evaluate the quality of a project and after this 
assessment, they decide whether to follow or not to follow. According to the quality of their assessment, 
they can accept good projects, reject bad ones, or make omission and commission errors.  
In addition to this and compared to incremental innovations, the implementation of such an innovation 
does not have clearly defined boundaries of potential gains and losses because in our model the spread 
of the innovation within the organization depends on the coordination costs that arise when innovators 
talk to their peers and try to convince them to be followers. How this is done mathematically is 
summarized in section 3. 
 
2.1.3 Innovations requiring a critical mass: In this instance the implementation of an innovation 
requires the support of a critical mass within the organization, otherwise the organization would remain 
trapped within its own inertia (see also Sydow et al., 2009, Mellor, 2015a and Mellor, 2015b). This 
could be, for example, where the organization must implement new technologies in the whole value 
creation process; the re/up-skilling of staff, networks with stakeholders, including suppliers, may have 
to be changed and the organizational culture and management style adapted accordingly (Mellor, 2003 
and see also Slater et al., 2013). For example, Chen et al. (2013), Harvey (2014) and Rogers (1983) all 
observed that in the case of radical innovations, project initiators may have to convince the relevant part 
of the organization to implement the project. However, reaching such a critical mass requires a complex 
coordination between employees and indeed this may overexert the whole organization. This is 
simulated in our approach because innovators have to balance expected gains of an innovation (again, 
they can err ex ante whether it is a good or bad innovation) with the coordination costs that arise for 
convincing sufficient colleagues. The simulations presented include where peers simply follow the 
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innovators because of joint myopia, and where employees evaluate the innovation first and make a 
decision to follow afterwards.  
Against the backdrop of collective myopia (Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014), the necessity for achieving a 
critical mass may obviate the negative effects incurred by following innovators with poor innovations 
(as long as the critical threshold is not reached). At first sight this contradicts claims by researchers in 
the field of organizational culture and organizational inertia (e.g. Slater et al., 2013), who argue that 
reducing the critical mass would be beneficial for implementing innovations and changes, however, it 
is in agreement with Kreps (1990) who argued that critical mass may also guarantee stability in a noisy 
environment (for a similar argument see also Nickerson & Zenger, 2002).  
 
2.2 Varying the architecture of the organization 
The above three types of innovations can be simulated in different organizational architectures that 
range from pure polyarchies to pure hierarchies as two extreme forms of economic organizing. Figures 
1-3 illustrate the three basic forms; polyarchy, hierarchy and a hybrid organization, and these are 
described in the following sections: 
 
 Figure 1: A Polyarchy Figure 2: A Hierarchical Firm Figure 3: A Hybird Organization 
 (own figure) (own figure) (own figure) 
 
 
2.2.1 Polyarchical organizations (Figure 1): In a polyarchy, agents can communicate with each other 
and make their decisions regarding the implementation of an innovation independently. Such a market-
like structure can also be described as a network of equal peers with similar powers, where all members 
are “nearest neighbor”. In such a polyarchy, agents are free to implement innovations individually (Sah 
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& Stiglitz, 1985, 1986) or they can convince their peers to act with them, for example in the case of 
innovations with spillover effects and/or of projects that require a critical mass.  
In the case of innovations with spillover effects, the members of a polyarchy can tell their peers about 
their ideas. However, convincing those peers is associated with coordination costs (Sah & Stiglitz, 1985, 
1986; Reagans et al., 2016; Wolter & Veloso, 2008); at the very least, the agents have to spend time and 
effort to explain their ideas, and for more complex projects, followers may have to even be given 
instruction and supervision, etc. These coordination costs have different effects: in the case of a “good” 
innovation, the coordination costs reduce the marginal gains of every additionally convinced peer. In 
the case of “bad” innovations, however, the coordination costs increase the damage of joint myopia 
because coordination costs increase the negative effects of herd behavior.  
Regarding innovations requiring a critical mass, our simulations assume that organizations have 
different critical points that make the difference between inertia and penetration. Some organizations 
might exist that can easily overcome their organizational inertia, while other organizations have to 
address the broad majority of its members to make a sustainable change (Garicano & Rayo, 2016; Slater 
et al., 2013; and Utterback, 1994). We model that innovators have to convince their peers, which require 
that they “invest” coordination costs to spread the idea up to and beyond the critical mass because project 
initiators have to invest time and possibly other resources, for lobbying and spreading the innovation 
within the organization. If initiators manage to convince a number that reaches the critical mass, then 
the project becomes established. Of course, some innovations might have an expected gain that is lower 
than the total coordination costs that would be necessary to reach the critical amount. In such a case, 
innovations will “die” and the organization will stay in its inertia. Similar is the case of innovations with 
spillover effect; convincing colleagues about “good” projects reduces the total gains, while spreading 
“bad” innovations increases the total damage.  
 
2.2.2 Hierarchical organizations (Figure 2): In this case, managers on different hierarchical levels have 
different executive functions and different decision-making powers. Below these managers are 
employees that are bound by instruction i.e. they are subordinates and assigned to one department 
governed by a manager. In such an organization, communication and decision-making follow clear 
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rules: decision processes are organized hierarchically and subordinates have to follow the instructions 
given by their managers. Bottom-up communication is possible, but the hierarchy works as a gatekeeper, 
meaning that any bottom-up proposals are subject to a managerial decision. Furthermore, that 
implementation without managerial acceptance is not possible. Such a hierarchical organization is the 
opposite of a polyarchy. While the former is organized vertically, the latter is organized horizontally. 
Thus, these two organizations illustrate two extreme forms of economic organizing, and because of this, 
we use these two extreme forms as reference points for the concept of the hybrid organization, which is 
practically-speaking, more relevant (see below).    
Regarding incremental innovations within a hierarchy, subordinates on the lower level can recommend 
projects to choose (Sah & Stiglitz, 1985, 1986), but they need the approval from their superiors, and 
without this approval they cannot implement the project. To approve the proposed innovation, the 
manager must review the quality of the project in order to prevent poor projects (i.e. judged as resulting 
in a negative cash value) from being implemented. However, managers can also make bad decisions (for 
a model theoretical contribution see Sah & Stiglitz, 1985, 1986; and for a general argument see Jensen, 
1988, Berg, 2016 and Garicano & Rayo, 2016), for example, they can reject “good” projects (type one 
error or commission error), and they can also accept “bad” projects (type two error or omission error). 
In our simulations, we model organizations with one, two and three hierarchical levels. In the case of a 
two-level hierarchy, the managers on the lowest level have to make a decision, and then their superior 
also has to make a decision. Only when both accept the project, the subordinate can implement it. 
Similarly, in the case with three levels, the managers at level 1, 2 & 3 all have to accept the idea otherwise 
the proposed project is rejected.  
In the case of an innovation with spillover effects, we follow the idea of a straight hierarchy with bottom-
up communication and top-down decision-making power. So, the subordinate initiator has to convince 
management gatekeepers about the quality of the proposed project before it can be implemented. Thus, 
the hierarchy prevents joint myopia (Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014). However, superiors make the decision 
for the whole organization whereupon the subordinates have to implement those projects accordingly, 
and independently of if it is a “good” or “bad” innovation; it only matters that the managers were 
convinced by the initiator.  
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In a hierarchy, initiators need the approval of their superiors in order to implement innovations that have 
to overcome a critical mass. Nevertheless, critical mass still has to be attained to achieve 
implementation. Thus, superiors have to weigh the expected gains from the project against the 
coordination costs needed for informing sufficient subordinates to reach critical mass within the 
organization. Because of this, they only implement projects if they expect that the gains of the 
innovations are higher than the coordination costs that are necessary to implement the innovation. As 
before, superiors may unwittingly approve ‘bad’ projects, where after the coordination costs incurred 
serve to increase the damage done by the project. As before, this can be expanded to additional levels 
of management with two and three levels of hierarchies. 
 
2.2.3 Hybrid organizations (Figure 3): Hybrid architectures are a combination of polyarchical and 
hierarchical structures (see Christensen & Knudsen, 2010; Knudson & Levinthal, 2007 and Siggelkow 
& Rivkin, 2005). Such organizations have a hierarchy, but the hierarchy does not have absolute control 
over information flow and decision rights. For example, in a hybrid organization, subordinates may be 
connected with peers from other departments through team or similar structures, enabling 
communication and decision-making in both vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal directions (Young-
Hyman, 2016), and possibly including that subordinates can work around the hierarchy gate-keeping. 
Consequently, the hierarchy loses absolute decision control.  
Regarding the simulation of incremental projects in hybrid organizations, subordinates can choose if 
they make the decision by themselves or if they prefer the hierarchy to decide. In our agent-based 
approaches, subordinates prefer making decision by themselves because they are convinced by their 
projects. Decision processes for these kinds of projects take place in hybrid organizations just like in 
polyarchies i.e. on a horizontal level; therefore, we do not present simulations of incremental projects 
in hybrid organizations, because the findings are similar to polyarchies. Nonetheless, future approaches 
might consider, for example, how subordinates’ risk aversion may influence to what extent subordinates 
prefer their superiors to make decisions.  
In the case of innovations with spillover effects in a hybrid organization, project initiators can spread 
their innovations by convincing their superiors, or they can use horizontal structures that emerge 
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through, for example, cross-departmental teams between hierarchical levels where project initiators use 
the option that maximizes the absolute expected gain of their projects. Because of bounded rationality, 
they choose the option that has a higher expected value regarding the implementation of the project. 
This means, if they expect that their superiors will support their project, they choose the hierarchy. 
However, if they expect that the chance of it spreading through the organization is higher, they will 
choose their horizontal network.  
Finally, in a hybrid organization, innovators must choose if they use the hierarchy for overcoming the 
critical mass, or if they try to use horizontal structures for spreading their ideas. We assume that 
innovators compare the expected gains by contrasting the hierarchy vs. horizontal paths and they choose 
the alternative that increases the expected gains. As we will highlight, the hybrid structures make it 
possible for innovators to overcome the critical mass constraints more easily than compared to 
polyarchies and hierarchies. However, this may not be an advantage if innovations are risky and if 
coordination costs increase the damage caused by poor innovations.  
 
3. Methodology and Simulation Design  
The advantages of using an in silico approach include that the interdependencies between project 
selection, organizational structure and performance can be precisely and independently controlled. 
Against the backdrop of the formulae given below, agency-based approaches were simulated by a 
stochastic Monte Carlo simulation. Methods are as described by Chib & Greenberg (1996) (a more 
recent overview is given by Davis et al. 2007 and by Robinson, 2014. For a general framework and for 
the application of Monte Carlo approaches in organizational research, see e.g. Almirall & Casadesus-
Masanell, 2010; Chang & Harrington, 2000; Cowan et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2009; and DeCanio et al., 
2000; as well as Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004a). 
Summarizing the ideas of our simulation (see Table 1 for an overview and 3.1 for details), random 
project portfolios (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) on the individual level were obtained from different normal distributions on the 
organizational level that result in negative ("bad") or positive ("good") innovations. This represents the 
main input into all organization architectures simulated. These portfolios were used across all three 
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organization architectures with some adaptations based on the architecture under investigation. The least 
complicated models are the ones for incremental innovations in polyarchies and hierarchies.  
Decision quality (π) of managers and peers was generated from uniform distributions, which represents 
the second core parameter adapted for most organizations. This parameter determines managers’ deci-
sions (𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 with 0: reject a project, or 1: accept a project). Further adaptations were introduced for different 
organization architectures to reflect the decision-making process e.g. the additional coordination costs 
incurred by persuading others. This parameter is added for our models with spillover effects and the 
ones that require a critical mass. For a detailed description of the models with innovations that have 
spillover effects in polyarchies, hierarchies and hybrids, see the corresponding equations (4) to (11) in 
3.1. Finally, we investigated how overcoming a critical mass influences organizational performance. 
Again, we simulate these effects in polyarchies, hierarchies and hybrids. For details see equations (12) 
until (17).  
 Polyarchy Hierarchy hybrid organizations 
Incremental innova-
tions 
Equation 1 and figure 
4 
Equations 2 & 3 and 
figure 4 





Equations 4, 5, 6 & 7 
and figure 6 
Equation 8 and figure 
6 
Equations 9, 10 & 11 
and figure 6 
Innovations that have 
to overcome a critical 
mass 
Equations 12 & 13 and 
figure 7 
Equation 14  and fig-
ure 7 
Equations 15, 16 & 17 
and figure 7 




3.1 Methodology and Simulation Design 
This section sets the foundation for modeling the aggregation of agents’ decisions, and explains the 
formulas used. In all models, the underlying decision rule is the same: Decision-makers (and their fol-
lowers) implement (or delegate implementation) when they expect an innovation to have a positive 
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value, and not if they expect economic damage. However, this decision is made under conditions of 
bounded rationality: 
3.1.1. Incremental innovations within a polyarchy: In a similar fashion to Sah & Stiglitz (1985, 1986), 
members can immediately implement the project they choose in a polyarchy (Figure 1). As a conse-
quence, the impact of such a choice for the whole polyarchy is the sum of all individuals’ chosen pro-
jects: 
 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  (1) 
We assume that the agents’ chosen projects can be represented by a cash value 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 with 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎2) 
where 𝜇𝜇 is the medium benefit per agent (e. g. the agent’s individual performance for implementing the 
innovation), and 𝜎𝜎2 is the variance. Regarding the innovation-generating process 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, we assume inno-
vations can have either negative, or positive cash value. For every organization, we simulated a mean 𝜇𝜇 
and standard deviation 𝜎𝜎 (while the mean 𝜇𝜇 and standard deviation 𝜎𝜎 is randomly obtained from uniform 
distribution). These two parameters define the average cash value of every innovation in this organiza-
tion. In a second step, we generate the parameter 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 randomly from normal distribution 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎2) for 
each employee. Then, agents implement the projects directly because they assume a positive innovation 
according to their bounded rationality (Sah & Stiglitz 1985 and 1986). Finally, the innovation’s real 
cash value unveils ex post to measure the organization’s performance. 
This approach enables us to simulate organizations that have different patterns of innovative behavior: 
from organizations with a high positive mean to organizations with an extremely negative mean of the 
innovations’ cash value on the one side and organizations with a low variance of the innovations’ cash 
value to a high variance of the value. For this simulation, the dataset includes 1,000 polyarchies with 
500 organization members (employees) each. The US Census Bureau (USCB, 2016) shows that the limit 
of 500 employees covers 99.7% of all firms. 
We simulate these parameters for all other organizations and their organizational members in a similar 
way. We ran additional simulations with 25, 50, 100, 250 and 10,000 employees in an organization to 
reveal if any size effects exist but found that such effects do not exist and because of this, only the 
findings using 500 are presented here. In the following sections we summarize how our other simula-
tions differ from this basis approach. 
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3.1.2. Incremental innovations within a hierarchy:  The following function is obtained for an organi-
zation with one hierarchical level, where the parameter 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 is the superior’s approval:  
 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦0, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  (2) 
The model considers the quality of managerial decisions, where the same 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 from above is used (incre-
mental innovations within a polyarchy), to ensure consistency between all models. The quality of the 
managers’ decision can be built into the formula as follows: 
 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 | 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝜋𝜋 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ (1 − 𝜋𝜋)0, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  (3) 
Where the parameter 𝜋𝜋 describes the quality of the manager’s decision, that is: with a probability of 𝜋𝜋, 
the decision is correct, meaning acceptance of good project and rejection of bad ones. Equally the prob-
ability of making a wrong decision is (1 − 𝜋𝜋). The quality of the managers’ decision-making is defined 
for every firm with 𝜋𝜋~𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(0.5; 1). This means that the quality of the management within the firm is 
equal, and spans between organizations from the extreme 𝜋𝜋 = 0.5 (managers make decisions as they 
would flip a coin, as in Sah & Stiglitz, 1985, 1986) until 𝜋𝜋 = 1, where managers possess perfect 
knowledge and decision-making skills (e. g. perfect rationality). Thus, the probability of acceptance is 
a conditional probability depending on the value of π, and the ratio between good and bad projects, 
meaning that 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 uses binary coding of either zero (no) for rejection, or one (yes) for acceptance. Values 
of π lower than 0.5 are excluded a priori in this work because such managers would systematically 
prefer bad projects to good ones and, while anecdotally such managers may exist, we assume they would 
soon leave the organization. However, it is known that under circumstances of managers acting "with 
guile", the damage is only slowly cumulative over several years (Mellor, 2016).  
Formula (3) illustrates the case of an organization with one hierarchical level, but clearly one can take 
organizations into account that have more e.g. two and three levels of hierarchies. This was modeled 
using the logical AND operator, so 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 for all manager in n hierarchies’ organization must be set to one 
(approval) in order to proceed with a project. This indicates that the probability that n managers decide 
to implement a good project will be πh where h is the number of hierarchies (managers). In case of 
accepting poor projects, we need h managers making the same bad decision in a row, resulting in a 
probability of (1- π)h. Therefore, the probability that an innovation is implemented – independent of its 
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quality – is in a hierarchy with h levels: (πh + (1- π)h). The probability that such a h-level hierarchy does 
not implement either a good nor a bad project is 1 – (πh + (1- π)h). 
  
 
 Incremental Innovations 
 Polyarchy 
 
 Incremental Innovations Incremental Innovations Incremental Innovations 
 Hierarchy (1 Level Hierarchy)   Hierarchy (2 Level Hierarchy)  Hierarchy (3 Level Hierarchy) 
Figure 4: Plots of the effect of incremental innovations on organization performance in polyarchies 
and hierarchical organizations (own figure) 
 
3.1.3. Incremental projects within hybrid organizations:  Regarding the simulation of incremental 
projects in hybrid organizations, subordinates could choose if they make the decision by themselves or 
if they want that the hierarchy makes a decision. Considering our agent-based approaches, subordinates 
would prefer making decision by themselves because of being convinced by their projects. Decision 
processes for these kinds of projects take place in hybrid organizations just as in polyarchies: on a 
horizontal level. Therefore, we do not simulate incremental projects in hybrid organizations here 
because the findings are similar to polyarchies. However, future approaches might consider, for 
example, how subordinates’ risk aversion may influence to what extent subordinates prefer to pass on 
decisions to their superiors. 
 
3.1.4. Innovations with spillover effects in a polyarchy: In line with ideas on coordinating collective 
innovative behavior (Sah & Stiglitz, 1985, 1986; Reagans et al., 2016; Wolter & Veloso, 2008), we 
assume that coordination costs increase in a linear fashion with every convinced peer, that is, convincing 
the first person invokes a cost of t, and convincing the second one causes 2t, etc. In the basic model that 
we use as a reference point, we assume that peers simply follow the initiator because of joint myopia. 














An extension of this model involves that peers do not behave as a herd and are able to individually 
evaluate the quality of the project and make a decision as to whether they follow or not. This is encap-
sulated in equation (7).  
In addition, we assume for the basic model that agents behave in a rational way i.e. that agents do not 
try to convince additional peers if that leads to marginal coordination costs that are in excess of the 
expected marginal gains made by convincing that additional person. Thus, in the case of a good innova-
tion (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0) we get for the polyarchy as a sum of the initial agent’s effects 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 and the effects of their 
followers: 
 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 +𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 0.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤) (4) 
Formula 4 compounds the initial portfolio 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 for the initiator, and the effect of following the initiator: 0.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤. This effect is calculated as the area of a triangle between the initial project’s cash value 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 till 
the last peer  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖/𝑤𝑤, who implements this project (this is illustrated by the green area in Figure 5). In 
formula (4) the parameter t describes the coordination cost that is necessary to convince and to instruct 
another peer. This cost was randomly obtained from uniform distribution using  𝑤𝑤 ~ 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛;𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚) 
on an organizational level (e. g. for every organization member, the cost t are identical, while the costs 
differ between organizations).  
 
Figure 5: Gains and losses in the case of innovations with spillover effects (green area: myopia in the 
case of a good innovation; red area: myopia in the case of a bad innovation) (own figure) 
 








Myopia for a 
Good Innovation
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 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤 −𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 0.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤) =  ∑ (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 −𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 1.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤) (5) 
 
Formula (5) describes the situation where the initiator and peers implement ‘bad’ innovations (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0), 
while increasing the damage that these projects inflict through accruing additional coordination costs as 
well. Because of this we get the factor 1.5 for a quadrilateral (the red area) plus a triangle represented 
by the green area (i.e. non-congruent portfolios, as illustrated by the red area in Figure 5). The quadri-
lateral represents the total damage done by all peers who follows the “bad” innovation, where the trian-
gle represents the total coordination costs that emerge through convincing peers about bad innovations. 
In case of bad innovations, the adopters mistakenly assume that the bad innovation would be a good 
innovation, an effect of collective myopia (Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014), thus for simplicity we assume 
that they are only wrong regarding the algebraic sign of the innovation’s cash value.2 Using formula (4) 
and (5), the effects of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ innovations for the whole organization can be given as: 
 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 0.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 1.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1   (6) 
As formula 6 highlights, the coordination costs form a natural boundary that restricts the spillover effects 
that emerge, when peers follow the initiator.  
A further level of sophistication is the consideration that followers might not just follow initiators, but 
rather independently evaluate the quality of the innovation. They can also choose if they want to become 
adopters or not (Jensen, 1988). These evaluations at the individual level result in a damping effect. For 
example, in the case of ‘bad’ innovations, initiators may cause less harm because peers can assess the 
quality and choose not to adopt. Errors of the second order are also possible: With ‘bad’ innovations the 
result would be some (but still less) damage for the polyarchy. Conversely, in the case of a good inno-
vation, initiators may only be able to convince few peers to adopt because of errors of the first order. 
These two effects can be combined to account for the quality of the peers’ decision-making 𝜋𝜋: 
                                                          
2 A different model design could be to assume that actors do not know the absolute cash value of an innovation 
and have to make prognoses about the volume of the cash value. In such a model where decision is related to 
expectation, the respective total gains (in the case of a good project) and respective total losses (in the case of a 
bad innovation) would obviously differ as compared to the above approach. However, if we assume a normal 
distribution around the "real" cash value for simulating such expectations, then we would on average get function 
(6)  for the organization as a whole (but not for the single innovation). In addition, such a simulation regarding 
expectations would not change the finding that in the case of following bad projects, the consequences are much 
worse than the consequences of following a good project with the same absolute cash value. Because of this, we 
simply assume that people are wrong regarding the algebraic sign. 
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 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ � 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 0.5 𝜋𝜋 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 1.5(1 − 𝜋𝜋) 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1    (7) 
 
3.1.5. Innovations with spillover effects in a hierarchy: As described above, the subordinate initiator 
has to convince management gatekeepers about the quality of the proposed project before it can be 
implemented. Thus, the hierarchy prevents herd behavior, and superiors make the decision for the whole 
organization whereupon the subordinates have to implement those projects accordingly. In this case, it 
is assumed that managers exhibit bounded rationality, and halt implementation at the point where mar-
ginal coordination costs begin to nullify the gains incurred by each additional subordinate implementing 
the project. In this approach, the coordination costs encompass the costs incurred to explain the proposed 
innovations to subordinates as well as other implementation costs. The following function can be derived 
for a firm with one managerial decision-making instance:  
 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 0.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 | 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 1.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 | 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ (1 − 𝜋𝜋)0, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1    (8) 
This can be continued for organizations with more than one level (i.e. two and three levels) of managerial 
decision-making authority. The underlying logic for a multi-level hierarchy is similar to the above hier-
archy with incremental innovations: The probability that h managers decide to implement a good inno-
vation will be πh where h is the number of hierarchies (managers). In the case of accepting poor projects, 
we need n managers making the same bad decision in a row. So we get a probability of (1- π)h. The same 
values of 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 were used in all cases, ensuring the comparability of models for each architecture modelled.  
3.1.6. Innovations with spillover effects in a hybrid organization: Innovators can convince their supe-
riors, or they can use horizontal structures for overcoming the hierarchy. They use the option that max-
imizes the absolute expected gain of their projects. For a hybrid organization with one level of hierarchy, 







𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 0.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜. ) > E(hori. ) | 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝜋𝜋
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 1.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜. ) > E(hori. ) | 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ (1 − 𝜋𝜋)
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 0.5𝜋𝜋 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜. ) < 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖. ) | 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 1.5(1 − 𝜋𝜋) 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, if 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜. ) < 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖. ) | 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 |𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖| −  𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤/1 − 𝜋𝜋 > 0 




  (9) 
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In formula (9), the first two parts define the effect if innovators decide to use the authority (the first one 
is in the case of accepting a good innovation and the second one it is accepting a bad innovation). The 
third and fourth parts of (9) represent the situation if the innovator spreads ideas horizontally (the third 
one illustrates the case if the innovator spreads a good idea and the peers evaluate it, and the fourth one 
highlights the case of a bad innovation and peers evaluate it). The terms E(hier. ) > E(hori. ) and E(hier. ) < E(hori. ), respectively, describe how project initiators compare the expected effects of using 
the hierarchy (presented by E(hier. ) – see below) with the expected impact they can achieve via using 
horizontal structures (E(hori. ) see below). Briefly, project initiators use hierarchical structures when 
their superiors approve, and where the absolute value attained through the hierarchy is higher than the 
value of using horizontal structures would be. If the effect of the horizontal structure is more beneficial 
in absolute terms, then they would spread their innovation horizontally and would not use the hierarchy 
(E(hier. ) < E(hori. )). Thus, innovation initiators look for that path which increases the expected gains 
of their innovation. 
We simulated these decisions for hybrid organizations with one, two and three hierarchical levels. In 
case of one hierarchical level, the expected value of the hierarchy is calculated using: 
 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜. ) = �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 0.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦| 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 1.5 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦|𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ (1 − 𝜋𝜋)0, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛    (10) 
while the expected value for the horizontal structure is determined by: 
 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖. ) = � 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 0.5𝜋𝜋 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 1.5(1− 𝜋𝜋) 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖2/𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0   (11) 
Again, the underlying logic for a multi-level hierarchy is similar to the above ‘hierarchy with incremen-
tal projects’: The probability that n managers decide to implement a good innovation will be πh, where 
h is the number of hierarchies. In the case of accepting poor innovations, we need n managers making 
the same bad decision in a row, resulting in a probability of (1- π)h. 
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Figure 6: Plots of the effects of innovations with spillover effects on organization performance in pol-
yarchies, hierarchies and hybrids (own figure) 
 
3.1.7. Innovations requiring a critical mass in polyarchical, hierarchical and hybrid structures:  
The simulations presented here assume that organizations have different critical points that make the 
difference between inertia and penetration and that these points are between 0% and 100%. Conse-
quently, the critical mass is defined as 𝑐𝑐~𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(0; 1) for every organization (within the organization 
the critical mass is constant for all innovations, and between organizations this parameter differs).The 
existence of a critical mass point has different implications for the modelling of the three organiza-
tional structures: 
(a) Innovations requiring a critical mass in a polyarchy: Here innovators have to convince their 
peers, which requires that they “invest” coordination costs to spread the idea up to and beyond the crit-
ical mass. Again, assuming (bounded) rational actors, innovators will only try to convince peers, if the 
expected gains are greater than the costs needed to reach the critical point. However, it could be 
equally so that initiators are trying to convince their peers to implement a negative innovation, where-
upon these coordination costs must be added to the damage caused. This is expressed in formula 12:  
 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 |𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖| − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 > 00, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 |𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖| − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 < 0𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1   (12) 
The term ct defines the coordination costs that have to be invested to convince the critical mass. As 
before, the effect of peer-evaluation on the quality of the project can be taken into account. This results 
in the following formula: 
 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ � 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤/𝜋𝜋, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 −  𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤/𝜋𝜋 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐/𝜋𝜋 < 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑦𝑦 𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 −  𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤/1 − 𝜋𝜋, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 |𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖| − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤/1 − 𝜋𝜋 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎  𝑐𝑐/1 − 𝜋𝜋 < 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑦𝑦 𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0, 𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . (13) 
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Formula (13) adjusts the critical mass according to the quality of the decision 𝜋𝜋. This means that, if 
innovators have a good innovation, they have to convince more people compared to the situation without 
individual evaluations (cf. the situation presented in Formula 12), and the same also holds for the situa-
tion when initiators unwittingly want to convince their peers to adopt a ‘bad’ innovation. Thus, in both 
cases, larger total coordination costs are necessary for implementing innovations because only some of 
the peers follow, each according to their own assessment of the innovation. Furthermore, the adjusted 
critical mass can reach a larger number than the size of the organization and in such a situation the 
project simply cannot be implemented because there is a quantitatively insufficient population within 
the organization.  
(b) Innovations requiring a critical mass in a hierarchy: For an organization with one level of hierar-
chy, we derive: 
 𝑏𝑏 = ∑ �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 | 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 | |𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖| − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ (1 − 𝜋𝜋)0, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 | 𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . (14) 
 Equation 14 shows that managers make the decision about if an innovation should be implemented or 
not, taking into account not only their evaluation regarding the quality of the innovation, but also upon 
total coordination cost ct that is necessary for convincing at least the critical mass, implying in turn that 
the total coordination costs must be expected to be lower than the expected gains. Otherwise managers 
would not assign the implementation even if they expect a good innovation.  
(c) Innovations requiring a critical mass in a hybrid architecture:  As in the case of innovations with 
spillover effects, innovators can spread their ideas by convincing their superiors, or they can use alter-
native horizontal structures. If we assume that innovators use the option that maximizes the expected 
absolute gain of their innovation (i.e. spreads their projects as widely as possible), then the organization 
with hybrid structures and one level of hierarchy can be modeled by: 






𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜. ) > 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖. )| 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝜋𝜋
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜. ) > 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖. )| |𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖| − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ (1 − 𝜋𝜋)
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤/𝜋𝜋, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜. ) < 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖. ) | 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤/𝜋𝜋 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎  𝑐𝑐/𝜋𝜋 < 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂.
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤/1 − 𝜋𝜋, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜. ) < 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖. ) | 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 |𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖| − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤/1 − 𝜋𝜋 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎  𝑐𝑐/1 − 𝜋𝜋 < 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂.0, 𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1  
  (15) 
In formula (15), the first two functions calculate the effects if innovators should choose their superiors, 
and the third and fourth function measure the effect if they choose horizontal structures for spreading 
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their ideas. Again, project initiators compare the benefits of using horizontal structures with the effects 
of using the hierarchy. This is illustrated by the terms E(hier. ) > E(hori. ) , and E(hier. ) < E(hori. ). 
In the case of just one hierarchical level, the expected value of the hierarchy is calculated through 
 𝐸𝐸(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜. ) = �|𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖| − 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤, 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ (1 − 𝜋𝜋)0, 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛   . (16) 
The expected value for the horizontal structure can be determined by 
 𝐸𝐸(hori. ) = � 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 −  𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤/𝜋𝜋,  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝜋𝜋 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐/𝜋𝜋 < 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂.|𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 �− 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝜋𝜋 , & 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 |𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖� − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1−𝜋𝜋 > 0 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐/1 − 𝜋𝜋 < 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 𝑂𝑂𝑜𝑜𝑂𝑂.0, 𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦   . (17) 
And this was simulated for structures in hybrid organizations with one, two and three hierarchical lev-
els.  
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Figure 7: Plots of the effect of innovations that have to overcome a critical mass on organization per-
formance in polyarchies, hierarchies and hybrids (own figure) 
 
 
3.2 Simulation methods and defining the parameters and running the simulations  
The parameters used in the Monte Carlo simulations are summarized in Table 1 below. Simulations 
were performed in Microsoft Excel and Maple 18 (www.maplesoft.com). Tools giving similar results 




Table A-T1: Overview of the parametrization used for the simulations 































Min. Max. Min.  Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. 
Polyarchy 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (1 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 0.5 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (2 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 0.5 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (3 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 0.5 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
             































Min. Max. Min.  Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. 
Polyarchy 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 n.a. n.a. 0 10 n.a. n.a. 
Polyarchy (with Assessment) 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 0.5 1 0 10 n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (1 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 0.5 1 0 10 n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (2 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 0.5 1 0 10 n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (3 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 0.5 1 0 10 n.a. n.a. 
Hybrid (1 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 0.5 1 0 10 n.a. n.a. 
Hybrid (2 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 0.5 1 0 10 n.a. n.a. 
Hybrid (3 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -20 20 0 20 0.5 1 0 10 n.a. n.a. 
             































Min. Max. Min.  Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. 
Polyarchy 1000 500 -1000 1000 0 1000 n.a. n.a. 0 10 0 1 
Polyarchy (with Assessment) 1000 500 -1000 1000 0 1000 0.5 1 0 10 0 1 
Hierarchy (1 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -1000 1000 0 1000 0.5 1 0 10 0 1 
Hierarchy (2 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -1000 1000 0 1000 0.5 1 0 10 0 1 
Hierarchy (3 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -1000 1000 0 1000 0.5 1 0 10 0 1 
Hybrid (1 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -1000 1000 0 1000 0.5 1 0 10 0 1 
Hybrid (2 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -1000 1000 0 1000 0.5 1 0 10 0 1 
Hybrid (3 Level Hierarchy) 1000 500 -1000 1000 0 1000 0.5 1 0 10 0 1 
Source: Own Table 
 
Each simulation was run with 1000 iterations and 500 agents per organization for each of the 20 models 
investigated. To look at the effect of age and size of organizations we initially modeled each 
specification at organization size 25, 50, 100, 250 and 500 agents, and noted that the findings were 
similar except that the 500 ones, having more points, gave a more precise analysis of the findings. In the 
simulations shown, the decisive differences between projects with incremental effects and projects that 
require a critical mass are the mean and the standard deviations of individuals’ innovations. In the case 
of incremental projects, the mean cash value of the project differs between -20 and +20 monetary units 
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(MU), while the standard deviation can go up to 20. For projects with a critical mass, organizations 
might reach much higher (absolute) cash values if they manage to implement such innovations and 
therefore we use a mean cash value between -1,000 and 1,000 MU with a standard deviation of up to 
1,000 for such projects.  
As seen previously, projects with spillover effects and projects that require a critical mass entail 
coordination costs. In these simulations the coordination costs were set between 0 and 10 MU across 
organizations and are constant within each organization. The reason for this was because when 
coordination costs add up to 10 MU in the extreme example, only three people could implement an 
incremental project with a cash value of 20 MU: the initiator (net value = 20 MU because of no 
coordination costs) and two change aides (where the net value for these two in sum = 10 MU because 
of gains of 40 MU and coordination costs of 30 MU). In the case of a project requiring a critical mass 
with a cash value of 1,000 MU, the critical mass must be below 20% because otherwise project initiators 
will never reach the critical mass needed. If the critical mass exceeded 20% then the high coordination 
costs would prevent the adoption of the project through the organization. Lastly; in the case of a 
polyarchy with change aide assessment, the critical mass needs to be much lower just because of the 
statistical occurrence of type one errors.  
 
4. Findings: How Organizational Structure Transforms Initial Projects into Performance 
Table 2 shows the empirical results of our simulations by summarizing (1) the average profit for an 
organization (see first row), the standard deviation of the profits (e.g. the risk, see second row) and (2) 
adds the slopes of the explanatory parameters that were used for estimating organizational performance. 
Two model types were used: The first type (see third row) is a univariate OLS regression of the organi-
zation’s mean value of an innovation on organizational performance (e.g. the sum of all cash values of 
all implemented good and bad innovations). The second type of OLS regressions estimate the organiza-
tional performance as a linear function of the parameters organization’s mean value of an innovation, 
quality of decision, coordination costs and critical mass (rows four to seven). The slopes of our regres-
sions describe to what extent changes in the underlying parameters influence corporate performance.  
(1) Average organization’s profit and risk: All simulations showed that additional hierarchical levels 
increase the average profitability in those cases where innovations have spillover effects or require a 
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critical mass by reducing the collective risk of the organization (see column standard deviation in Table 
2). Additional hierarchical levels showed a reduced marginal effect on profitability and risk: implement-
ing a hierarchy with one-level in a polyarchical organization has a much stronger effect than increasing 
the hierarchical levels from two to three. This effect can be seen by considering the slope of the innova-
tion’s mean where the OLS estimated parameter (see rows three and four) can be interpreted as the 
average aggregation of innovations into organizational performance: What would be the aggregated 
effect if we could increase the mean of the initial project portfolio by 1 Monetary Unit for all 500 agents 
in the organization (for example through employee training that increases the organization’s mean of 
the average innovation)? As the numbers highlight, additional hierarchical levels reduce this slope (for 
example for a hierarchy incremental effects as shown in the third column "Regression Model I": a slope 
of 248 for a one-level hierarchy, 166 for a two-level, and 125 for a three-level hierarchy) because of the 
structure’s influence on omission and commission errors (Sah & Stiglitz, 1985 and 1986, see also 
Csaszar, 2012). As a consequence, more hierarchical levels systematically increase the number of re-
jected projects, the immediate consequences of which include that the collective risk (see second row) 
is reduced and this holds for all project types and organizations.  
 
 



































Polyarchy 69 5,727 500 *** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (1 Level Hierarchy) 1,659 3,091 248 *** 249 *** 6800 *** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (2 Level Hierarchy) 1,648 2,285 166 *** 166 *** 6800 *** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (3 Level Hierarchy) 1,440 1,936 125 *** 125 *** 6600 *** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
             
 
Descriptive Statistics Regression Model I Regression Model II 



































Polyarchy -169,680 4,489,632 22000 * n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Polyarchy (with Assessment) -5,505 576,010 5500 *** 5600 *** -12000  5300  n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (1 LevelHierarchy) -5,511 577,154 5500 *** 5600 *** -12000  5300  n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (2 Level Hierarchy) 14,615 195,746 2700 *** 2500 *** 74000 * -5400 *** n.a. n.a. 
Hierarchy (3 Level Hierarchy) 15,831 155,914 1800 *** 1700 *** 78000 ** -6200 *** n.a. n.a. 
Hybrid (1 LevelHierarchy) -30,017 1,170,256 8800 *** 9200 *** -130000  18000  n.a. n.a. 
Hybrid (2 Level Hierarchy) -7,876 676,657 6500 *** 6600 *** -23000  6700  n.a. n.a. 
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Hybrid (3 Level Hierarchy) -4,408 608,932 6000 *** 6100 *** -13000   4900   n.a. n.a. 
             
 
Descriptive Statistics Regression Model I Regression Model II 



































Polyarchy -70,769 209,992 122 *** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Polyarchy (with Assessment) -6,396 143,818 136 *** 139 *** 210,000 *** 3,000 ** 31,000 ** 
Hierarchy (1 Level Hierarchy) 4,890 90,412 105 *** 107 *** 170,000 *** -2,600 *** -38,000 *** 
Hierarchy (2 Level Hierarchy) 16,173 61,046 60 *** 61 *** 130,000 *** -3,900 *** -49,000 *** 
Hierarchy (3 Level Hierarchy) 16,716 48,902 40 *** 41 *** 110,000 *** -3,700 *** -46,000 *** 
Hybrid (1 LevelHierarchy) -15,441 152,307 170 *** 174 *** 220,000 *** 3,300 *** 27,000 ** 
Hybrid (2 Level Hierarchy) -6,986 147,177 150 *** 153 *** 220,000 *** 2,800 ** 27,000 ** 
Hybrid (3 Level Hierarchy) -5,341 145,667 143 *** 146 *** 210,000 *** 2,800 ** 27,000 ** 
 
Table 2: An overview of the empirical findings. Note: The stars indicate the following significance 
levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05 and *** < 0.01. Own calculations. 
 
Regarding the interdependence of the number of hierarchical levels with profitability (see Table 2, first 
row), the mixed results obtained illustrate that profitability can depend on the interactions between the 
characteristics of the portfolio of the initial projects and the organizational structures. Firstly, the number 
of hierarchical levels has a reversed U-shape effect on profitability in the case of innovations with in-
cremental effects. Thus, there is a tradeoff between increasing profitability and reducing risks. The other 
two initial portfolios show only a declining effect. The reason for this is that innovations with spillover 
effects, as well as those that require a critical mass, cause a distribution function, which in turn is more 
extreme and skewed to the left and this is because communication costs and collective myopia (in the 
case of errors of the second order) reinforce each other. In this situation, additional hierarchical levels 
have a positive net effect: on the one side, the firm has to abandon any positive effects of myopia because 
of errors of the first order; however, the net effect of rejected ‘bad’ innovations is stronger. In these 
simulations the reversed U-shape effect of hierarchical levels on profitability appears absent, although 
this effect could possibly emerge if the simulations were run again with 4 or more levels of hierarchy. 
Another finding is that multi-level hierarchies achieve a high number of rejected projects and are thus 
quite robust against the negative effects of joint myopia. Even multi-hierarchical organizations with a 
poor assessment of innovations achieve relatively good results compared to polyarchies or hybrid or-
ganizations. Thus, in a world in which employees tend to think up ‘bad’ innovations, employing a hier-
archy of poor managers is still much better than having no hierarchy at all or having hybrid architectures. 
30 
 
Indeed, when we insert extreme values, we see that hierarchies can achieve better results even where 
the decision-making ability of the management only marginally exceeds coin-flipping frequency. These 
results support the findings of Ethiraj & Levinthal (2004b) as well as Siggelkow & Rivkin (2005), who 
argue that concentration into highly centralized firms may be the superior alternative when the environ-
ment is complex and turbulent, whatever the quality of managers’ decision-making is.  
(2) The explanatory role of the innovations’ mean cash value, assessment quality, and coordination 
costs on organizational performance: The quality of decision making (see Table 2, fifth row) is remi-
niscent of what Siggelkow & Rivkin (2005, p. 119) described as “interdependencies can create surpris-
ing and subtle effects that, without systematic analysis, can lead intuition astray.” In the case of an initial 
project portfolio with incremental innovations, the quality of managerial decision making has a similar 
effect on organizational performance independent of the levels of hierarchy (as the first row of Table 2 
highlights). In the case of innovations with spillover effects in a hierarchy, the corresponding slope for 
managerial quality is much steeper than for innovations with only incremental effects. In a hierarchy, 
one sees the strongest effect of managerial quality in the case of innovations that require overcoming a 
critical mass, because the quality of the managers decision-making has enormous consequences for the 
organization: in the case of rejecting a good innovation, opportunity costs are quite high, and in the case 
of accepting a bad innovation, the losses may become enormous. In addition to this, the slope of mana-
gerial quality in hierarchies declines when the number of hierarchies is increased because managers have 
a much stronger effect on corporate performance in flatter organization. But this only holds for innova-
tions that have to overcome a critical mass.  
Concerning polyarchies and hybrid organizations regarding innovations with spillover effects, the qual-
ity of the assessment does not seem to have any straightforward effect, in that the estimated parameters 
have a negative sign but are not statistically significant. This may be related to the results of Knudsen 
and Srikanth (2014) who reported from their simulations that polyarchies and hybrid organizations 
might be over-challenged when undergoing coordinated exploration and because of this, the decision 




Coordination costs and the size of the critical mass hurdle (Table 2, see rows six and seven) have quite 
different effects on organizational performance depending on the organizational architecture. Firstly, 
hierarchical organizations become much more profitable when they achieve a reduction of coordination 
costs and/or critical mass, because it is easier for innovators and their superiors to exceed lower critical 
mass hurdles, in order to implement innovations and the same is seen for coordination costs. Secondly, 
for polyarchies and hybrid organizations the situation is exactly reversed regarding the influence of 
coordination costs and the critical mass. Higher coordination costs and a higher critical mass increase 
the performance. The reason for this surprising and counter-intuitive result is that agents can also initiate 
bad innovations and under these conditions, incurring high coordination costs and/or a high critical mass 
hurdle prevents poor innovations from spreading and this reduces potential losses. Shortly, for poly-
archies and hybrid organizations it is better to relinquish good projects because of a high organizational 
inertia, rather than implementing more projects that have high risks in terms of performance. This find-
ing supports the argument of Nickerson & Zenger (2003) that inertia does not necessarily have to have 
negative consequences for the organization.  
In the case of innovations that have to overcome a critical mass, the gradients of the slopes measuring 
the impact of innovations’ cash values on performance are much higher for hybrid organizations than 
for hierarchies and even higher than the corresponding slopes derived for polyarchies, which shows that 
improving the initial project portfolio has a much higher impact on a hybrid organization than in any 
other organizational structure. For example, for innovations that require a critical mass the slopes in the 
third and fourth row of Table 2 show that a hybrid organization has 3.5 times higher “leverage” of 
transforming innovations into corporate performance compared to an organization with three hierar-
chical levels). Comparing hierarchies with hybrids in the case of innovations with spillover effects, sim-
ilar values are seen and indeed slopes are greater than the slopes pertaining to firms with just one hier-
archical level but adding more hierarchical levels in hybrid organizations only caused a slight reduction 
in the steep slope, including with projects that require a critical mass.  
The results reported here support the idea of Csaszar (2013), namely that exploration and exploitation 
are not achieved through different processes, but rather they are the aggregated consequences of the 
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same (micro) processes within different architectures. We show that polyarchies and hybrid organiza-
tions are much more explorative than hierarchies for projects with spillover effects and those that require 
a critical mass, nevertheless hierarchies achieve in average a higher performance and can reduce the 
risks of initial project portfolios through selecting out more (explorative) projects. From this point of 
view, hierarchies promote exploitation, and this might even give them a competitive advantage as long 
as explorative projects involved are quite risky. Obviously, a higher quality of managerial decision-
making within a hierarchy will tend to increase exploration because managers will make fewer errors of 
the first order. However, the low gradients of the slopes of the innovations’ effects reveal that even here, 
the architecture may retain dominance for hierarchies, when compared to polyarchies and hybrid organ-
izations.  
 
5. Discussion  
5.1. From optimizing within structures to designing organizational architectures: 
Summarizing our findings in the light of previous reports, our simulations largely confirm the overall 
findings of Sah & Stiglitz (1985, 1986) and Csaszar (2012) in that decentralized structures seem to 
accept more innovations because of fewer errors of the first order (e.g. commission errors) and more 
errors of the second order (e.g. omission errors). Additionally, our findings also confirm the result of 
Knudson & Levinthal (2007) that the average performance of hybrid structures lies between the perfor-
mance of hierarchies and polyarchies. Our findings also echo Siggelkow & Rivkin (2005) and Csaszar 
& Eggers (2013), who argue that adaptations of the organizational architecture may cause surprising 
performance effects, and this confirmation may provoke further analyses on the variance and risk that 




Figure 8: Designing an organization (own figure) 
 
Hitherto unreported findings included in this work are firstly that systematic dependencies exist between 
project selection on the individual level, organizational structures and corporate performance, indicating 
that the aggregation of agents’ decisions is not as chaotic as other scholars have assumed (see e.g. Abell 
et al., 2008; and also Barney & Felin, 2013; Felin et al., 2015; Goldstein, 1999; Sawyer, 2002) but 
rather, that subtle interdependencies exist. Christensen & Knudsen (2010, p. 84) argue that most contri-
butions in the field of management research focus on optimizing organizations, however finding an 
appropriate organizational design would appear to be a fundamental challenge that has to be answered 
before one can turn to optimizing already existing architectures. Figure 8 summarizes how different 
parameters may define which organizational architecture is superior. 
 
5.2. The Superiority of Hybrid Organizations: 
Figure 8 summarizes that a strict multi-level hierarchy is superior compared to all other architectures in 
environments where initial innovation portfolios are on average poor, or contain a high risk of failing 
(e. g. many bad and good innovations, see Khanna et al., 2016; Perry-Smith & Mannucci, in press) and 
where it is quite difficult to assess the quality of projects, indeed even in hierarchies where the quality 
of managers’ assessment is poor to the point of random choice, they may still be the best route. The 
regression results highlight (see the slopes in row three and four of Table 2) that where the initial port-






























might be a superior form of organization because the horizontal and vertical communication pathways 
within hybrids enable them to have alternatives for spreading good innovations in the case of managerial 
omission errors. Nevertheless in the case of risky innovations portfolios, hybrid organizations are also 
vulnerable, being liable to joint myopia. Because of this, introducing even a low probability of commit-
ting commission errors may cause adverse effects.  
Regarding initial portfolios containing low-risk projects, the performance of hierarchies was inferior 
compared to polyarchies and hybrid organizations. The reason for this is that hierarchies systematically 
reject more innovations (see also Sah & Stiglitz, 1985, 1986 as well as Csaszar, 2012) and indeed the 
gradients of the slopes that illustrate the aggregation of initial portfolios are much steeper in polyarchies 
and hybrid organizations (see the slopes in row three and four of Table 2). Depending on the initial 
portfolio, polyarchies are superior in the case of innovations with spillover effects which are not assessed 
by the agents, whereas hybrid architectures are superior in the case of innovations that require a critical 
mass or when agents assess projects that may cause spillover effects. In the former case, herd behavior 
causes high gains in a polyarchy because of the low risks associated with the innovation and because of 
the absence of hierarchical structures that might intervene and cause commission errors. In the latter 
case, hybrid structures are superior because the concatenation of horizontal and hierarchical structures 
enables agents to initiate projects even when commission errors happen.  
 
5.3. The Superiority of Polyarchies: 
That polyarchies achieve poor results in average and reach only a good performance if the initial inno-
vation portfolio has low risks, fits well in the research on market failure (e.g. market for lemons, see 
Akerlof, 1970, Kultti et al., 2012, Moreno & Wooders, 2016): Markets (that are polyarchy-like struc-
tures) may collapse because actors have issues in assessing the real risks of an interaction, and indeed 
markets work quite well if interactions are low-risk. Even if we perceive polyarchic markets as daily 
and wide-spread phenomena, the interactions that take place there are highly restrained regarding risk.   
 
5.4. Improving the Performance of Hierarchies: 
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While analyzing which structures might be superior in a given context, in many cases finding an appro-
priate organizational design would appear a prerequisite before one can turn to optimizing already ex-
isting architectures, and thus it appears essential to determine how existing organizations might be 
adapted to become more successful. This question of re-designing organizations is especially addressed 
in the literature on the ambidextrous organization (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Benner & Tushman, 2015; 
and O’Reilly III & Tushman, 2013) and as Csaszar (2012) points out; ambidexterity does not emerge 
through different processes within an organization, but is rather a consequence of the organization’s 
architecture. If that is the case, then the findings reported here may well be relevant to the question of 
how to make hierarchical organizations more ambidextrous. Table 2 and Figure 8 show that when the 
initial projects have a low risk of failure, the hierarchical organization benefits most when decisions are 
made on low hierarchical levels or if horizontal structures are added to the hierarchy for creating a more 
hybrid organization, and indeed the introduction of a more hybrid structure might be superior compared 
to delegation to lower hierarchical levels.  
However, if initial innovations are risky, then hierarchies are more resilient than polyarchic organiza-
tions and, under conditions of high risks, organizations can follow two different approaches as to how 
to handle these risks; either by adding further hierarchical instances on decision-making, or by increas-
ing the quality of the decision-making process. Of course, hybrid organizations can also benefit by in-
creasing the quality of decision-making but in a hybrid organization the decision-making quality has to 
be increased throughout the whole organization, while in hierarchies the decision-making quality is lo-
calized to the hierarchy and needs only to be increased in the management layer, a cheaper and easier 
option.   
Of course, another option might be to seek advice outside the organization, using experts or special 
structures (Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014, pp. 432-433) that select innovations from portfolios regarding 
potential risks. This would mean that innovations with low risks can be decided upon by low hierarchical 
levels or within hybrid structures, while risky innovations have to be decided through multi-level hier-
archies. This raises the prospect that the open innovation literature (Cheng et al., 2014; Felin & Zenger, 
2014, Benner & Tushman, 2015, West & Bogers, 2013, Wolter & Veloso, 2008) and most parts of the 
research on ambidexterity (Benner & Tushman 2003, Benner & Tushman 2015; and O’Reilly III & 
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Tushman, 2013) might be biased regarding the handling of risky innovations through architectures other 
than the traditional hierarchy. From an ex-post perspective, it is easy to say that a reduction in the hier-
archy and the removal of clear boundaries may promote exploration, and this can lead to great innova-
tions; but the prerequisite is that the number of commission errors must be low even when the environ-
ment is risky. Our findings reveal that as long as hierarchical firms cannot reduce the number of com-
mission errors in a risky environment, then a multi-level hierarchy is superior, even when it entails 
rejecting some great innovations.   
The results presented here are also relevant regarding the role of team structures in explaining corporate 
performance. Scholars like Chen et al. (2013); Foss & Lindenberg (2012; 2013); Harvey (2014); Lin-
denberg & Foss (2011); Reagans et al. (2016) and Young-Hyman (2016) have argued that firms with 
team structures are more beneficial than hierarchical firms with a strict vertical communication, but the 
results presented here show that erecting team structures causes a more hybrid organization, which in 
turn is an extremely risky gambit if the organization exists in an environment with a large proportion of 
innovations that are unsuitable for the firm. Such team structures may promote negative forms of col-
lective myopia and reduce the resilience against “bad” innovations that require a critical mass. In other 
words, something like Google’s often-praised organizational structure (see Yarow, 2015) might only be 
“best practice” when employees come up with positive projects and exhibit a high degree of expert 
decision making when evaluating innovations proposed by their colleagues. Otherwise replicating 
Google’s organizational structure may well cause high deficits. 
 
5.5 Hierarchies, polyarchies and the theory of the firm: 
Interestingly our findings contain a strong supplement to the “theory of the firm” (Coase, 1937), which 
explains the existence of the hierarchical firm through the relatively high transaction costs for market 
interactions. Our results strongly imply that in parallel to transaction costs, another logic may sustain 
the existence of hierarchical firms, namely reducing the risk of choosing poor projects, which in turn 
implies that introducing new technologies that reduce transaction costs do not necessarily have to result 
in the collapse of the traditional hierarchical firm. As Miller (1992) highlights, the hierarchical firm with 
clear formal boundaries was a consequence of the industrialized mass production process with assembly 
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lines, and thus reduced transaction costs and new forms of value creation processes may allow a return 
to pre-assembly line structures: it would become easier for freelancers, small organizations and also big 
firms to cooperate (see e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2015; p. 507;  Cheng et al., 2014;  Felin & Zenger, 
2014; West & Bogers, 2013 as well as Wolter & Veloso, 2008). However, in a world with low transac-
tion costs and risky innovations, firms may emerge with a formal core surrounded by an open structure 
of horizontal teams and networks with open boundaries for provoking, spreading and harvesting inno-
vations, while the formal core contains an efficient hierarchy for selecting only appropriate projects. 
Indeed, this also applies to non-profit organizations (NPOs). Firstly, NPOs also have to choose projects 
for achieving their social and ecological agendas. These projects might also be risky and as a conse-
quence, hierarchies might be necessary even if these organizations often perceive themselves as being 
quite different compared to well-established for-profit firms (Valentinov et al. 2015, Will 2015, Will et 
al. 2017b). Our findings also explain why many big players in the NPO sector (e.g. Greenpeace or 
Oxfam) have multi-level hierarchies for selecting their projects on the one side and on the other side 
polyarchical networks of supporters for fund-raising and communicating the organization’s agendas. In 
the light of our findings, this is hardly surprising because fund-raising and communicating agendas that 
are already decided upon, is low-risk compared to selecting an NPO’s project. Secondly, this and previ-
ous work (Csaszar & Eggers, 2013) shows that the democratization of the firm (Hielscher et al., 2014) 
may cause enormous challenges in actually selecting projects and implementing innovations. Thus, it is 
hardly surprising that some researchers e.g. Michelsen (1994) and Schneiberg (2011) found only few 
examples of successful cooperation between similar polyarchies in competitive market economies, and 
the findings presented here can now actually explain this well-known effect, namely that such structures 
promote joint myopia and this in turn threatens the organization.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks and Further Research 
Scholars from the field of organizational behavior including Chen et al. (2013); De Dreu & West (2001); 
Foss & Lindenberg (2012); Harvey (2014); Hewlett et al. (2013) as well as Lovelace et al. (2001)  all 
argue that “hybrid” team structures may increase idea generation, innovative behavior and, finally, cor-
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porate performance. Thus, teams are regarded as better for transforming ideas into productive innova-
tions. This behavioral approach has strong arguments giving rise to serious doubts around the question 
if rigid hierarchies can be competitive in the long run. The results presented here are based on the reality 
that poor projects can also spread throughout the organization, resulting in high losses, and that this is 
especially damaging when peers have difficulties in assessing the quality of the project to be introduced. 
Our findings indicate that hybrid organizations with hierarchies and horizontal team-structures might be 
highly competitive as long as agents’ decision quality is high or as the projects’ risks are low. Secondly, 
organizations can also become more hybrid by deciding which projects can be decided in a hybrid struc-
ture and which projects have to be decided within a clear hierarchy. Further research might use these 
findings and add behavioral feedback effects on motivation and project selection that might emerge 
through hybrid structures (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2014; Linden-
berg, 2015; as well as Powell et al., 2011, pp. 1374-1376). 
March (1991) as well as Vargas-Hernández (2011) highlighted that risk- and innovation management 
may be complementary, and this study supports their view insomuch as this relationship follows from 
interdependencies between organizational architecture, performance and risk. As we highlight, an ap-
propriate organizational design may increase profits and reduce risks through a clever selection of pro-
jects until a given point is reached at which a tradeoff between profitability and risk emerges. Beyond 
this point, additional profits are only possible with increased chance of additional risk. Our argumenta-
tion (summarized in Figure 8) gives some ideas of how organizations can move this point. Nevertheless, 
a specific organizational context may require highly pronounced structures for avoiding tradeoffs be-
tween risks and profits. Finding such solutions is an empirical challenge and further empirical research 
on firm parameters (size, organizational structure, staff’s qualifications, investments in R&D, etc.) is 
needed as well as contemplating more global industry indicators (degree of competition, proximity to a 
cluster, embeddedness into global value chains, etc.) before this can be resolved. 
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Appendix: Table A: Regression analysis results 
 
 
Innovations with Incremental 
Effects                
                 







      
Innovation Mean 500 ***     248 *** 166 *** 125 ***       
Constant 0.0287       1.60E+03 *** 1.60E+03 *** 1.40E+03 ***       
Number of Obs 1000       1000   1000   1000         
R-squared 0.998       0.849   0.6934   0.5463         
Adj R-squared 0.998       0.8488   0.6931   0.5458         
F-Test 4.90E+05       5.60E+03   2.30E+03   1.20E+03         
Log Likelihood -7.00E+03       -8.50E+03   -8.60E+03   -8.60E+03         
                 
                 







      
Innovation Mean         248.505 *** 166.173 *** 125.03 ***       
Quality of Decision        6.80E+03 *** 6.80E+03 *** 6.60E+03 ***       
Constant         -3.40E+03 *** -3.40E+03 *** -3.50E+03 ***       
Number of Obs         1000   1000   1000         
R-squared        0.9505   0.8783   0.7902         
Adj R-squared        0.9504   0.8781   0.7898         
F-Test        9.60E+03   3.60E+03   1.90E+03         
Log Likelihood         -8.00E+03   -8.10E+03   -8.20E+03         
                 
                 
Innovations with Spillover Effects            
                 







Hybrid (1 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Hybrid (2 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Hybrid (3 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Innovation Mean 22,000 * 5,500 *** 5,500 *** 2,700 *** 1,800 *** 8,800 *** 6,500 *** 6,000 *** 
Constant -170,000   -6,100   -6,100   14,000 ** 16,000 *** -31,000   -8,600   -5,100   
Number of Obs 1000   1000   1000   1000   1000  1000   1000   1000   
R-squared 0.0033   0.0125   0.0125   0.0255   0.019  0.0077   0.0125   0.0132   
Adj R-squared 0.0024   0.0115   0.0115   0.0245   0.018  0.0067   0.0115   0.0122   
F-Test 3.3543   12.5922   12.6198   26.083   19.3441  7.7666   12.6554   13.3505   
Log Likelihood -1.70E+04   -1.50E+04   -1.50E+04   -1.40E+04   -1.30E+04   -15000   -15000   -15000   
                 
                 









Hybrid (1 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Hybrid (2 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Hybrid (3 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Innovation Mean     5,600 *** 5,600 *** 2,500 *** 1,700 *** 9,200 *** 6,600 *** 6,100 *** 
Quality of Decision     -12,000   -12,000   74,000 * 78,000 ** -130,000   -23,000   -13,000   
Coordination Costs     5,300   5,300   -5,400 *** -6,200 *** 18,000   6,700   4,900   
Constant     -23,000   -23,000   -14,000   -12,000   -26,000   -25,000   -20,000   
Number of Obs     1000   1000   1000   1000  1000   1000   1000   
R-squared     0.0132   0.0132   0.0351   0.0379  0.0102   0.0134   0.0138   
Adj R-squared     0.0102   0.0103   0.0322   0.035  0.0072   0.0104   0.0108   
F-Test     4.442   4.4508   12.0646   13.0805  3.4104   4.5153   4.6418   
Log Likelihood     -1.50E+04   -1.50E+04   -1.40E+04   -1.30E+04   -15000   -15000   -15000   
                 
                 
Innovations Requiring Critical 
Mass                
                 







Hybrid (1 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Hybrid (2 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Hybrid (3 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Innovation Mean 122.444 *** 135.814 *** 105.187 *** 59.5156 *** 40.4461 *** 170.434 *** 149.733 *** 143.004 *** 
Constant -3.70E+04 *** -2.80E+03   7.70E+03 *** 1.80E+04 *** 1.80E+04 *** -1.10E+04 *** -3.00E+03   -1.50E+03   
Number of Obs 1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   
R-squared 0.2346   0.2778   0.4216   0.2961   0.2131   0.3901   0.3224   0.3002   
Adj R-squared 0.2338   0.2771   0.4211   0.2954   0.2123   0.3895   0.3217   0.2995   
F-Test 305.822   383.884   727.559   419.771   270.256   638.248   474.887   428.161   
Log Likelihood -1.30E+04   -1.30E+04   -1.30E+04   -1.20E+04   -1.20E+04   -1.30E+04   -1.30E+04   -1.30E+04   
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Hybrid (1 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Hybrid (2 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Hybrid (3 Level 
Hierarchy) 
Innovation Mean     138.788 *** 106.995 *** 60.7472 *** 41.4393 *** 173.576 *** 152.813 *** 146.022 *** 
Quality of Decision     2.10E+05 *** 1.70E+05 *** 1.30E+05 *** 1.10E+05 *** 2.20E+05 *** 2.20E+05 *** 2.10E+05 *** 
Coordination Costs     3.00E+03 ** -2.60E+03 *** -3.90E+03 *** -3.70E+03 *** 3.30E+03 *** 2.80E+03 ** 2.80E+03 ** 
Critical Mass     3.10E+04 ** -3.80E+04 *** -4.90E+04 *** -4.60E+04 *** 2.70E+04 ** 2.70E+04 ** 2.70E+04 ** 
Constant     -1.90E+05 *** -8.40E+04 *** -3.60E+04 *** -2.30E+04 *** -2.00E+05 *** -1.90E+05 *** -1.90E+05 *** 
Number of Obs     1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   1000   
R-squared     0.3272   0.5135   0.4802   0.4412   0.4392   0.3726   0.3494   
Adj R-squared     0.3245   0.5115   0.4781   0.4389   0.437   0.3701   0.3468   
F-Test     120.955   262.543   229.798   196.395   194.822   147.724   133.612   
Log Likelihood     -1.30E+04   -1.20E+04   -1.20E+04   -1.20E+04   -1.30E+04   -1.30E+04   -1.30E+04   
Note: The stars indicate the following significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05 and *** < 0.01. Own calculations.  
